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This prospective cohort study, performed during the 
2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic, was aimed to determine 
whether adults working in acute care hospitals were at 
higher risk than other working adults for influenza and to 
assess risk factors for influenza among health care workers 
(HCWs). We assessed the risk for influenza among 563 
HCWs and 169 non-HCWs using PCR to test nasal swab 
samples collected during acute respiratory illness; results 
for 13 (2.2%) HCWs and 7 (4.1%) non-HCWs were positive 
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Risk Factors for Influenza among Health Care Workers
for influenza. Influenza infection was associated with 
contact with family members who had acute respiratory 
illnesses (adjusted odds ratio [AOR]: 6.9, 95% CI 2.2–21.8); 
performing aerosol-generating medical procedures (AOR 
2.0, 95% CI 1.1–3.5); and low self-reported adherence to 
hand hygiene recommendations (AOR 0.9, 95% CI 0.7–
1.0). Contact with persons with acute respiratory illness, 
rather than workplace, was associated with influenza 
infection. Adherence to infection control recommendations 
may prevent influenza among HCWs.
The numerous outbreaks of influenza described in acute care hospitals indicate that influenza transmission in 
this setting is of major concern (1–3). Nonetheless, it re-
mains unclear whether health care workers (HCWs) are at 
higher risk for infection than are adults working in non-
clinical settings (non-HCWs). Vaccination recommenda-
tions for HCWs are intended primarily to protect patients 
from hospital-acquired influenza and influenza-associated 
death (4,5). Although working in hospitals has been pro-
posed as a risk factor for influenza (6), findings that support 
that working in health care settings poses an occupational 
risk (7), or that performing particular activities or working 
in specific health care disciplines are associated with an in-
creased risk for influenza infection, are sparse.
Better understanding of risk factors for infection among 
HCWs would support decision-making regarding priorities 
for seasonal influenza vaccination, antiviral treatment or 
prophylaxis programs, implementation of other measures 
to reduce influenza transmission in hospitals, and planning 
for pandemics. Therefore, we aimed to assess risk factors 
for influenza among HCWs and to determine whether, 
during the first 2 waves of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, 
HCWs working in acute care hospitals were at higher risk 
than non-HCWs for symptomatic influenza.
Materials and Methods
Participants and Setting
The Influenza Cohort Study, initiated by the Working 
Adult Influenza Cohort Study Group, a research team based 
in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, was started in May 2009. The 
purpose of the study was to examine incidence, clinical 
features, and epidemiology of infection caused by A(H1N1)
pdm09 among HCWs and other working adults in Canada. 
For this analysis, participants were enrolled during May 29–
September 27, 2009. Participants were eligible if they were 
18–75 years of age and either worked >8 hours per week 
in 1 of 5 acute care hospitals (HCW) or in an office-based 
setting in Toronto (non-HCW). Non-HCWs were intended 
to provide a sample of working adults at low occupational 
risk for influenza, so as to bias the study toward the ability 
to identify an occupational risk in health care. Details of 
the recruitment of these control participants are included 
in the online Technical Appendix (wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/19/4/11-1812-Techapp.pdf). The study was approved 
by the Research Ethics Boards of all participating hospitals 
and universities and by the human resources departments of 
participating employers.
Upon enrollment, participants received a collection 
kit, an illustrated guide, and instruction from a nurse for 
mid-turbinate nasal swab sample self-collection. They also 
completed a Web-based questionnaire detailing influenza 
vaccination history, underlying medical conditions, 
demographic data, potential work- or school-related 
risk factors for respiratory virus infection, and potential 
community risk factors. Blood samples were taken from 
consenting participants at enrollment and again in April or 
May of 2010. 
Participants were asked to complete weekly Web-
based diaries from enrollment until March 31, 2010, 
detailing respiratory symptoms and acute respiratory 
illness (ARI) or febrile illnesses and documenting time-
dependent risk factors (e.g., contact with persons with 
ARI symptoms). Per the study protocol, if any signs or 
symptoms suggestive of an ARI developed, participants 
provided a self-collected mid-turbinate nasal swab sample 
as soon as possible after onset to be tested for influenza by 
using PCR. ARI was defined as 1) fever without another 
obvious source; or 2) new symptoms, including >2 of the 
following: runny or stuffy nose, sneezing, sore or scratchy 
throat, hoarseness, or cough; or 3) one local (runny/
stuffy nose, sneezing, sore/scratchy throat, hoarseness, or 
cough) and 1 systemic symptom (fever, malaise, myalgia, 
headache, or fatigue).
Participants whose specimens tested positive for 
influenza were offered treatment in accordance with 
public health recommendations (8). All participants with 
undetermined A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine status as of March 
31, 2010, were contacted again to confirm whether they 
had received it and, if so, when. For logistical reasons, 
participants with unconfirmed 2009–2010 seasonal 
influenza vaccine status could not be contacted again; 
instead, these participants were assumed not to have 
received it. In Canada, vaccine for A(H1N1)pdm09 
became available for HCWs and patients at high risk 
for complications of influenza during calendar week 43 
(starting October 25, 2009) and was available for healthy 
adults during calendar week 47 (starting November 22).
Definitions
For this study, HCW were defined as persons working 
in an acute care hospital. A non-HCW was defined as 
a person working in an office-type environment not 
associated with the provision of health care. The first and 
second waves of the influenza pandemic in Ontario were 
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defined as the periods for which the weekly proportion 
of respiratory specimens that were positive for A(H1N1)
pdm09 was >5%, as reported by the Ontario Agency for 
Health Protection and Promotion. Similarly, seasonal 
influenza waves were defined as periods for which >5% 
of weekly specimens tested positive for seasonal influenza. 
By this definition, the first pandemic wave occurred during 
calendar weeks 21–31 of 2009 (May 17–August 8); the 
second wave occurred during calendar weeks 39–48 
(September 27–December 5). Peak weeks were defined 
as weeks during which positivity rates were >15% and 
comprised calendar weeks 21–27 (May 17–July 11) during 
wave 1 and calendar weeks 41–46 (October 11–November 
21) during wave 2. As expected, few cases of seasonal 
influenza were identified during the study period.
Aerosol-generating medical procedures were defined 
as any of the following: administration of nebulized therapy 
or humidified oxygen at >40%, use of bag-valve mask, 
manual ventilation, noninvasive ventilation, open airway 
suctioning, bronchoscopy or other upper airway endoscopy, 
tracheostomy, endotracheal intubation, cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation, oscillatory ventilation, or any procedure 
that involved manipulation of open ventilator tubing in 
a mechanically ventilated patient or sputum induction or 
other deliberate induction of coughing.
Adherence to hand hygiene and facial protection 
recommendations was defined as the self-reported 
proportion of situations during which hand hygiene and 
facial protection were performed according to infection 
control recommendations (9). Symptomatic influenza 
infection was defined as influenza-positive PCR results for 
a participant-collected mid-turbinate nasal swab sample.
Antibody Assays and Interpretation
Serum specimens were extracted from blood samples 
and 1 mL aliquots frozen at −70°C. Aliquots were tested 
by hemagglutination-inhibition (HAI) assay to determine 
antibody titers against the A(H1N1)pdm09 strain (A/
California/07/2009-like) and the 2008–09 seasonal 
A(H1N1) strain (A/Brisbane/59/07) to identify potential 
cross-reactivity by using a protocol adapted from World 
Health Organization methods (10). Two HAI assays were 
performed per aliquot by using 0.5% turkey erythrocytes 
and 4 hemagglutination units per 25 µL of virus. For 
discordant pairs, the higher of the 2 geometric mean titers 
was used. Serum specimens were tested at the Queen 
Elizabeth II Health Sciences Centre, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 
Canada. Seroprotection was defined as having HAI antibody 
titers of >40. Seroconversion was specifically defined as a 
prevaccination HAI titer of <10 and a postvaccination titer 
of >40 or a 4-fold change in titers for participants with a 
prevaccination titer of >10 (11,12).
Data Management and Statistical Analyses
Data were entered online by the participants, then 
cleaned and manually inspected for errors and outlying 
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Table 1. Characteristics of study participants in the Influenza Cohort Study performed during 2009 pandemic, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada* 
Characteristic 
Participant values by cohort, n = 732 
No. HCWs in acute care 
facilities, n = 563 
No. non-HCWs in office 
settings, n = 169 p value 
Mean age, y ( SD) 42.2 (11.3) 45.4 (10.8) 0.001 
Female sex 478/563 (84.9) 133/169 (78.7) 0.06 
Recipient of vaccine    
 A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine† 469/554 (84.7) 66/165 (40.0) <0.001 
 Seasonal influenza vaccine 2009–10 226/563 (40.1) 41/169 (24.3) <0.001 
 Seasonal influenza vaccine 2008–09 407/552 (73.7) 76/164 (46.3) <0.001 
Underlying health conditions    
 Asthma 55/555 (9.9) 14/167 (8.4) 0.56 
 Diabetes mellitus 22/555 (4.0) 5/165 (3.0) 0.58 
 Allergies to airborne irritants 235/509 (46.2) 60/155 (38.7) 0.10 
 Current smoker or smoker in household 73/551 (13.3) 27/163 (16.6) 0.28 
Potential exposure conditions    
 Hand-to-face habits 275/557 (49.4) 76/168 (45.2) 0.35 
 Wearing of prescription eyeglasses 386/561 (68.8) 119/168 (70.8) 0.62 
 Reusable water bottle use 1/week 232/556 (41.7) 81/169 (47.9) 0.15 
 Public transit: 8 trips per week 196/558 (35.1) 45/168 (26.8) 0.04 
 Group gathering attendance 524/563 (93.1) 150/167 (89.8) 0.17 
 Face-to-face contacts/d, median (IQR) 10 (5, 20) 10 (5, 20) 0.94 
 >1 person/bedroom in household 192/551 (34.9) 51/166 (30.7) 0.33 
 Children in workplace 62/558 (11.1) 9/167 (5.4) 0.03 
 Child <5 y in household 77/563 (13.7) 10/169 (5.9) 0.006 
 Child <18 y in household 212/563 (37.7) 59/169 (34.9) 0.52 
 Child in household attends day care 77/555 (13.9) 16/164 (9.8) 0.17 
*Data are no./total (%) unless otherwise specified. HCW, health care worker; A(H1N1)pdm09, pandemic influenza A(H1N1) 2009 virus; IQR, interquartile 
range. 
†Participants who had acquired A(H1N1)pdm09 <7 d after vaccination were considered unprotected. 
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values. Differences in group proportions were assessed by 
the c2 or Fisher exact test, as appropriate, and differences 
in means (for normally distributed data, on the basis of the 
Shapiro-Wilk test for normality) and medians (for non-
normally distributed data) were calculated by using Student 
t test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test, respectively.
The analysis for the primary objective (i.e., to 
determine whether the risk for laboratory-confirmed 
symptomatic influenza was higher in HCWs than in non-
HCWs) included all participants who were enrolled by 
the start of the second wave of the 2009 H1N1 influenza 
pandemic (calendar week 39, starting September 27, 2009). 
Multivariable generalized estimating equation logistic 
regression analysis was used to determine adjusted odds 
ratios with 2-sided 95% CIs for constant and time-dependent 
risk factors for symptomatic influenza infection on the basis 
of information from baseline questionnaires and weekly 
diaries. Model construction was performed on the basis of 
the method proposed by Harrell (13) including A(H1N1)
pdm09 vaccination status and changing risk for influenza 
infection over time (community influenza activity). Our a 
priori approaches to adjust for changing risk for influenza 
infection over time were to 1) adjust for weekly percentage 
of specimens positive for influenza reported to the Ontario 
Agency for Health Protection and Promotion (continuous 
variable) and 2) adjust for peak weeks (defined as weeks 
during which >15% of specimens were positive for 
influenza; [dichotomous variable]). Vaccine failure among 
participants was defined as acquiring A(H1N1)pdm09 
infection after receipt of A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine >7 days 
before symptom onset. Participants who acquired A(H1N1)
pdm09 within 7 days after vaccination were considered not 
fully protected. To evaluate the validity of this assumption, 
we performed sensitivity analyses by calculating lags of 0 
days and 14 days, respectively. The same criteria were used 
in the analysis of the secondary objective (i.e., to determine 
risk factors for laboratory-confirmed symptomatic 
influenza among HCWs). The models with the lowest 
quasi-likelihood under the independence model criterion 
were preferred.
Data were analyzed in SAS, version 9.1 for PC (SAS 
Institute, Cary, NC, USA). We considered p values <0.05 
as statistically significant.
Sample Size
This study was initiated at the onset of the 2009 influenza 
pandemic; because the expected incidence of infection was 
unknown, a formal sample size was not established. Details 
of the sample size estimate for the planned seasonal study 
can be found in the online Technical Appendix.
Results
Study Population, Symptomatic Influenza  
Case-patients and Community Influenza Activity
The first participant was enrolled in the study on May 
28, 2009 (calendar week 21). By October 11 (calendar week 
41), at the start of the second wave of the pandemic, 732 
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Figure. Flowchart of 732 persons 
enrolled in the Influenza Cohort 
Study, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
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participants were enrolled in the Influenza Cohort Study: 
563 (76.9%) were HCWs who worked in 1 of 5 community 
and teaching acute care hospitals in the Toronto area and 
169 (23.1%) were non-HCWs who worked in an office 
environment not associated with the provision of health care 
(Table 1; Figure). Of the 2 cohorts, HCWs were younger 
and were more likely to have been vaccinated against 
seasonal and pandemic influenza, to work with children, 
to have children <5 years of age in their households, and to 
use public transportation >8 times per week. Of 422 HCWs 
who were vaccinated against A(H1N1)pdm09, 403 (95.5%) 
received vaccine within 2 weeks after its availability; of 61 
non-HCWs, 28 (45.9%) were vaccinated during the same 
time period (p<0.001).
A total of 334 (45.6%) study participants submitted 
436 nasal swab samples. More than half (52.1%) of these 
samples were collected on the day of symptom onset (day 
1), 19.4% on day 2, 9.9% on day 3, and 12.1% on or after 
day 4. Among the 20 (4.6%) specimens yielding influenza, 
12 (60.0%) were collected on day 1, four (20.0%) on 
day 2, three (15.0%) on day 3, and one (5.0%) on day 4 
of illness. Thirteen (2.2%) of 563 HCWs and 7 (4.1%) of 
169 non-HCWs submitted samples that tested positive for 
influenza. A(H1N1)pdm09 was detected in 19 (95%) of 
the 20 positive participants: 1 case during each of calendar 
weeks 24, 25, 31, 39, 40, and 47; two cases during each 
of calendar weeks 42, 44, and 45; and 7 cases during 
calendar week 43. Thus, 16 of 19 cases occurred during 
weeks of peak A(H1N1)pdm09 activity. Seasonal influenza 
A(H3N2) virus was isolated in a sample from 1 participant 
during calendar week 43.
Risk Factors for Symptomatic Influenza Infection
The probability of symptomatic influenza infection 
did not differ between HCWs and non-HCWs (p = 0.28) 
(Table 2). Study participants who had a child <18 years of 
age living in the household (36.2% of influenza negative/
untested participants vs. 65.0% of influenza positive 
participants; p = 0.009), a child who attended day care 
living in the same household (12.5% vs. 30.0%; p = 0.03), 
and who were not vaccinated against A(H1N1)pdm09 >7 
days before onset of infection (76.3% vs. 10.0%; p<0.001) 
were more likely to have respiratory illness with positive 
test results for influenza.
After adjusting for A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccination 
history and community influenza activity, we found no 
difference in the risk for influenza infection between 
persons working in an acute care hospital (HCWs) and 
other healthy adults (non-HCWs) (Table 3). Rather, 
contact with a family member with an ARI in the previous 
week was the main risk factor for symptomatic influenza 
infection, irrespective of the method of adjusting for 
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Table 2. Results of influenza virus testing of nasal swab specimens from 732 study participants in the Influenza Cohort Study 
performed during 2009 pandemic, Toronto, Ontario, Canada* 
Characteristic 
Influenza test status 
No. negative or not ill, n = 712† No. positive, n = 20‡ p value 
Mean age, y ( SD) 42.9 (11.3) 43.9 (9.3) 0.69 
Female sex 595/712 (83.6) 16/20 (80.0) 0.76 
Worker in acute care hospital 550/712 (77.3) 13/20 (65.0) 0.28 
Recipient of vaccine    
 A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine§ 533/699 (76.3) 2/20 (10.0) <0.001 
 Seasonal influenza vaccine 2009–10 258/712 (36.2) 9/20 (45.0) 0.42 
 Seasonal influenza vaccine 2008–09 470/696 (67.5) 13/20 (65.0) 0.81 
Underlying health conditions    
 Asthma 67/702 (9.5) 2/20 (10.0) 1.00 
 Diabetes mellitus 26/700 (3.7) 1/20 (5.0) 0.54 
 Allergy to airborne irritants 284/646 (44.0) 11/18 (61.1) 0.15 
 Current smoker 63/704 (9.0) 3/20 (15.0) 0.42 
Potential exposure conditions    
 Hand-to-face habits¶ 337/705 (47.8) 14/20 (70.0) 0.05 
 Wearing of prescription eyeglasses 493/709 (69.5) 12/20 (60.0) 0.36 
 Reusable water bottle use >1/ wk 307/705 (43.6) 6/20 (30.0) 0.23 
 Public transit 8 trips per week 236/706 (33.4) 5/20 (25.0) 0.43 
 Group gathering attendance >1 655/710 (92.3) 19/20 (95.0) 1.00 
 Face-to-face contacts/d, median (IQR) 10 (5, 20) 15 (8, 20) 0.53 
 Household crowding index >1# 233/697 (33.4) 10/20 (50.0) 0.12 
 Children in workplace 68/705 (9.7) 3/20 (15.0) 0.43 
 Child <5 y in household 83/712 (11.7) 4/20 (20.0) 0.28 
 Child <18 y in household 258/712 (36.2) 13/20 (65.0) 0.009 
 Child in household attends day care 87/699 (12.5) 6/20 (30.0) 0.03 
*Data are no./total (%) unless otherwise specified. A(H1N1)pdm09, pandemic influenza A(H1N1) 2009 virus; IQR, interquartile range. 
†Participants who did not report any illness or whose nasal swab samples tested negative for influenza. 
‡All participants who tested positive were symptomatic. 
§Participants who had acquired A(H1N1)pdm09 <7 d after vaccination were considered unprotected 
¶Defined as biting one’s nails or cuticles or habitually putting one’s fingers in his or her mouth or nose. 
#Household crowding index is defined as number of persons per household divided by the number of bedrooms. 
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changing risk over time. In general, quasi-likelihood 
under the independence model criterion statistics were 
lower in models adjusting for weekly percentage of 
specimens yielding influenza than in those adjusting for 
weeks of peak influenza activity (results not shown). A 
sensitivity analysis calculating lags of 0 and 14 days (vs. 7 
days) from the time of receipt of A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine 
did not alter these results.
Analyses restricted to HCWs and including potential 
occupational risk factors in health care are shown in 
Table 4. During the study period, 49.6% of HCWs 
worked in emergency departments, medical inpatient 
wards, intensive care units, or pediatric wards; 12.9% 
were present during >1 and 9.4% performed >1 aerosol-
generating medical procedure per week. Approximately 
one quarter (26.5%) of HCWs reported providing direct 
care for >1 patient per week who had ARI. The analysis 
of risk factors for infection indicates that, similar to the 
combined study population, HCWs with symptomatic 
influenza infection confirmed by positive nasal swab 
sample were more likely to have children <18 years of 
age in their households (69.2% of HCWs who tested 
positive vs. 36.9% who tested negative or were untested; 
p = 0.02) and less likely to have been vaccinated against 
A(H1N1)pdm09 >7 days before onset of infection 
(15.4% vs. 86.3%; p<0.001) (Table 4). Compared with 
other HCWs, those with symptomatic influenza infection 
were more likely to be present during aerosol-generating 
medical procedures >1× per week (38.5% vs. 12.7%; p 
= 0.02) and reported lower adherence to hand hygiene 
recommendations (77.5% vs. 95%; p = 0.02). After 
adjustment for changing risks for influenza infection 
over time, risk factors for influenza infection among 
HCWs were: contact with a family member with ARI in 
the previous week, performing or assisting with aerosol-
generating medical procedures, and lower adherence to 
hand hygiene recommendations (Table 5).
HAI Antibody Assays
Among the combined study population, 450 (61.5%) 
of 732 participants provided pre- and post-influenza season 
blood samples. Among those, 3.6% had protective HAI 
titers against A(H1N1)pdm09 at baseline. There was no 
association with workplace and baseline HAI titers. Of 
the 142 (31.6%) participants who tested positive after 
enrollment, 137 (96.5%) had received the A(H1N1)pdm09 
vaccine, 2 (1.4%) submitted a nasal swab that tested positive 
by PCR, and 3 (2.2%) did not submit a swab for testing or 
report an ARI (consistent with asymptomatic infection).
Analysis of data collected during the period after 
vaccine became available for unvaccinated participants 
without known previous A(H1N1)pdm09 infection showed 
that 8 (16.3%) of 49 HCW and 3 (5.3%) of 57 non-HCWs 
seroconverted or had a positive mid-turbinate nasal swab 
sample. Although persons working in an acute care hospital 
were 3.1× as likely as other working adults to be infected 
with influenza, the results were not significant in this small 
unvaccinated group (95% CI 0.9–11.1). Influenza among 
unvaccinated participants was not associated with age, sex, 
or any of the other characteristics listed in Table 1.
Discussion
In this prospective cohort study conducted in Canada 
during the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic, we found 
no association between working in an acute care hospital 
and risk for influenza infection. Our findings are similar 
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Table 3. Risk factors for symptomatic influenza infection among health care workers in acute care hospitals and non–health care 
workers in office settings during 2009 pandemic, Toronto, Ontario, Canada* 
Risk factor OR (95% CI), adjusted† OR (95% CI), multivariable‡ 
Worker in acute care hospital 0.49 (0.19–1.27) 0.47 (0.17–1.32) 
Age, y, per 10 y increase 1.08 (0.76–1.54) NA 
Female sex 1.03 (0.30–3.56) NA 
Recipient of A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine§ 0.28 (0.03–2.28)¶ 0.34 (0.04–2.85) 
Weekly percentage of specimens yielding influenza per 5% increase 1.49 (1.28–1.73)# 1.36 (1.13–1.63) 
Potential exposure conditions   
 Hand-to-face habits** 3.09 (1.12–8.52) NA 
 Child <18 y in household 3.13 (1.21–8.07) NA 
 Contact with family member with ARI in prior wk 5.51 (1.81–16.76) 6.89 (2.17–21.84) 
 Contact with co-worker with ARI in prior wk 0.77 (0.10–6.16) NA 
 Household crowding index >1†† 1.99 (0.79–5.05) NA 
 Public transit >8 trips per wk 0.62 (0.22–1.76) NA 
*Constant and time-dependent risk factors for symptomatic influenza infection (positive nasal swab specimen) in 732 primary contacts of the Influenza 
Cohort Study followed during June 2009–April 2010, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. OR, odds ratio; NA, not applicable; A(H1N1)pdm09: pandemic influenza 
A(H1N1) 2009 virus; ARI: acute respiratory illness. 
†Adjusted for receipt of A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine and weekly percentage of specimens yielding influenza. 
‡Multivariable model including all variables with ORs listed below. 
§Participants who had acquired A(H1N1)pdm09 <7 d after vaccination were considered unprotected. 
¶Adjusted for weekly percentage of specimens yielding influenza only. 
#Unadjusted. 
**Defined as biting one’s nails or cuticles, habitually putting one’s fingers in his or her mouth or nose. 
††Household crowding index is defined as number of persons per household divided by the number of bedrooms. 
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to those of Williams et al., who assessed serologically 
confirmed influenza during the 2007–08 influenza season 
in Berlin, Germany (14). They found no association 
between HCW status and influenza but demonstrated that 
the presence of children in the household and ownership 
of a car among participants with no children in the 
household were risk factors, whereas receipt of seasonal 
influenza vaccine was found to be protective. Similarly, 
Marshall et al. found no overall difference in influenza 
infection rates between hospital workers who did and 
did not have patient contact during the 2009 pandemic in 
Australia, but the authors identified exposure to children 
as a risk for influenza (15).
The results of this cohort study also add insight into 
occupational risk factors for influenza among persons who 
work in acute care hospitals. In contrast to a finding by 
Kawana et al. (16), neither our study nor those of Marshall 
et al. and Seto et al. detected an increased risk for influenza 
among workers who had direct patient care responsibilities 
(17). However, Marshall et al. indicated that working in 
an intensive care unit of a hospital was a risk factor for 
influenza, and wearing gloves while caring for patients who 
were on droplet precaution was protective. These findings 
are similar to ours in that exposure to aerosol-generating 
medical procedures, which are most often performed in 
intensive care units, was a risk factor for influenza, and 
adherence to hand hygiene, which may have an effect 
similar to appropriate glove use, was protective. Although 
collinearity of both putative risk and protective factors 
may continue to make it difficult to accurately identify risk 
factors for acquisition of influenza in health care settings, 
our data highlight the role of hand hygiene in the control of 
influenza infection (18), and of protective equipment use 
by persons who perform or assist with aerosol-generating 
medical procedures. 
The mode of transmission of influenza remains a 
matter of ongoing debate. Although most experts believe 
that droplet and aerosol transmission are the most 
common modes of spread of influenza, our finding and 
that of Marshall et al. (15), as well as the evidence from 
the elementary school–based study by Talaat et al. that 
increasing hand hygiene adherence reduces the risk for 
infection with influenza, suggest that transmission by direct 
or indirect contact contributes substantially to influenza 
transmission (18). Appropriate hand hygiene practice 
should continue to be recommended to prevent influenza 
transmission.
Pandemic influenza vaccine became available in 
Canada at the peak of the second wave of the pandemic. 
This complicated our analysis in that the risk for 
influenza infection depended on differing times of receipt 
of influenza vaccine and on timing of the pandemic 
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Table 4. Characteristics of 563 health care workers in acute care hospitals during 2009 pandemic, Toronto, Ontario, Canada* 
Characteristic 
Influenza test status  
No. negative or not ill, n = 550† No. positive, n = 13‡ p value 
Mean age, y ( SD) 42.2 (11.4) 42.5 (10.1) 0.91 
Female sex 467/550 (84.9) 11/13 (84.6) 1.00 
Occupation    
 Nurse 180/539 (33.4) 3/13 (23.1) 0.55 
 Physician, physiotherapist, respiratory therapist 103/539 (19.1) 5/13 (38.5) 0.15 
 Other§ 256/539 (47.5) 5/13 (38.5) 0.52 
Potential exposure conditions    
 Received A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine¶ 467/541 (86.3) 2/13 (15.4) <0.001 
 Child <18 y in household 203/550 (36.9) 9/13 (69.2) 0.02 
 Child attending day care in household 74/542 (13.7) 3/13 (23.1) 0.40 
 Cares for >1 patient with ARI per week 141/539 (26.2) 5/12 (41.7) 0.32 
 Working in high-risk area# 227/461 (49.2) 7/11 (63.6) 0.35 
 Present during aerosol-generating medical procedure >1/wk** 66/521 (12.7) 5/13 (38.5) 0.02 
 Performs aerosol-generating medical procedure >1/wk 49/540 (9.1) 3/13 (23.1) 0.11 
 Years’ experience, mean ( SD) 13.6 (11.4) 14.0 (9.3) 0.91 
 % adherence to hand hygiene, median (IQR) 95.0 (80.0–100) 77.5 (60.0–92.5) 0.02 
 Adherence to facial protection, %, median (IQR) 80 (50–99) 50 (30–75) 0.16 
 Hours worked per week, no. median (IQR) 40.0 (37.5–45.0) 37.5 (32.0–40.0) 0.22 
*Data are no./total (%) unless otherwise specified. A(H1N1)pdm09, pandemic influenza A(H1N1) 2009 virus; ARI, acute respiratory illness; IQR, 
interquartile range. 
†Participants who either did not report any illness or whose nasal swab samples tested negative for influenza. 
‡All participants who tested positive were symptomatic. 
§The distribution of other persons working in acute care hospitals was: administrative personnel: 30.4%; patient attendant/health care aide/service 
assistant: 0.4%; housekeeper/porter/central sterile supply/dispatch: 0.5%; medical imaging technologist/technician: 1.6%; pharmacist/pharmacy 
technician: 2.0%; ward clerk/unit coordinator: 1.4%; psychologist/social worker: 1.6%; laboratory technologist/technician: 4.7%; nutritionist/other food 
service staff: 1.1%; other: 3.4%. 
¶Participants who had acquired A(H1N1)pdm09 <7 d of vaccination were considered unprotected. 
#Emergency room, medical inpatient ward, intensive care unit, or pediatric ward. 
**Aerosol-generating medical procedures are defined as any one of: administration of nebulized therapy or humidified oxygen at >40%, use of bag-valve 
mask, manual ventilation, non-invasive ventilation, open airway suctioning, bronchoscopy or other upper airway endoscopy, tracheostomy, endotracheal 
intubation, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, oscillatory ventilation, any procedure performed that involves manipulation of open ventilator tubing in a 
mechanically ventilated patient, sputum induction or other deliberate induction of coughing. 
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waves. We addressed these issues by using multivariable 
generalized estimating equation logistic regression for 
the analysis, which facilitated adjustment for timing of 
receipt of vaccine, and we accounted for the dynamics of 
the pandemic waves by incorporating weekly percentages 
of laboratory specimens that tested positive for influenza 
virus. We believe that our results are robust because 2 
different approaches to adjust for changing risk over time 
led to the same results. Nevertheless, whether the relative 
percentage of positive specimens reflects the relative 
number of influenza cases in the community remains a 
matter of debate.
Our study has several limitations. It has a lack 
of power related to the small number of cases of 
symptomatic influenza during the second wave of the 
pandemic in this population of working adults. We 
attempted to minimize selection bias by using broad 
inclusion and limited exclusion criteria; nevertheless, 
the possibility of having access to rapid diagnosis and 
treatment during the second pandemic wave might have 
resulted in biased enrollment of participants who had a 
higher self-perceived risk for influenza infection, and 
perception of risk might differ between persons working 
in acute care hospitals and persons working in nonclinical 
settings. Similarly, generalizability may be hampered 
because participants in studies of influenza could differ 
from others in their attitudes toward vaccine acceptance 
and infection prevention practices. We tried to reduce the 
possibility of measurement bias in nasal swab collection 
by having a broad interpretation of respiratory illness 
because the interpretation of more detailed criteria for 
signs or symptoms of influenza infection (e.g., influenza-
like illness) might differ between HCWs and non-HCWs, 
but differences might have remained. Although the self-
collection of swab specimens occurred over 1–4 days 
after illness onset, it is unlikely that any cases would 
have been missed because previous studies have shown 
that A(H1N1)pdm09 remains readily detectable within 
this period (19–21). The study encompasses a selective 
sample of persons working in a limited number of acute 
care hospitals and other working adults with Internet 
access in a single geographic area during the 2009 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. Although we deliberately 
selected controls likely to be at low risk for occupational 
exposure to influenza (e.g., not working in an occupation 
exposed to numerous children) in an effort not to miss an 
effect of the health care work environment, unmeasured 
biases in our control selection could have been present. In 
addition, our results may not be generalizable to seasonal 
influenza or to geopolitical areas where infection control 
practices in hospitals are different.
The yield of self- or parent-collected nasal swab 
specimens has been shown to be comparable to health 
care provider–collected nasopharyngeal aspirates from 
children and adults (22–24), but whether the yield of 
self-collected nasal swabs differs between HCWs and 
non-HCWs has not been assessed. There is evidence that 
microneutralization of antibody assays may demonstrate 
a greater sensitivity than HAI (25); as a result, we may 
have missed seroconversion by using the latter. Further 
seroconversions might have been missed by the delay 
between the first (upon enrollment) and the second 
 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 19, No. 4, April 2013 613
Table 5. Risk factors for symptomatic influenza infection in health care workers in acute care hospitals during 2009 pandemic, Toronto, 
Ontario, Canada* 
Risk factor 
OR (95% CI), 
adjusted† 
OR (95% CI), 
multivariable‡ 
Age, y, per 10 y increase 0.99 (0.63–1.56) NA 
Female sex 1.79 (0.23–14.04) NA 
Potential exposure conditions   
 Receipt of A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine§ 0.49 (0.07–3.67)¶ 0.40 (0.04–3.99) 
 Weekly specimens yielding influenza, %, per 5% increase 1.56 (1.29–1.88) # 1.43 (1.17–1.73) 
 Child <18 y in household 3.33 (1.00–11.05) NA 
 Contact with family member with ARI in prior week 7.26 (2.15–24.54) 7.86 (2.20–28.04) 
 Contact with co-worker with ARI in prior week 1.40 (0.16–12.40) NA 
 Cared for patient with ARI in prior week 1.50 (0.44–5.14) NA 
 Adherence to hand hygiene recommendations, per 10% increase 0.84 (0.73–0.98) 0.86 (0.74–0.99) 
 Adherence to facial protection recommendations, per 10% increase 0.92 (0.79–1.07) NA 
 No. AGMP performed or assisted during previous week, per 10 procedures increase** 2.29 (1.26–4.17) 1.95 (1.10–3.48) 
*Generalized estimating equation logistic regression analysis of constant and time-varying risk factors for influenza infection in 563 health care workers in 
acute care hospitals, Influenza Cohort Study, followed during June 2009–April 2010, OR, odds ratio; A(H1N1)pdm09: pandemic influenza A(H1N1) 2009 
virus; NA, not applicable; ARI: acute respiratory illness; AGMP: aerosol-generating medical procedures. 
†Adjusted for receipt of A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine and weekly percentage of specimens yielding influenza. 
‡Multivariable model including all variables with ORs listed below. 
§Participants who had acquired A(H1N1)pdm09 <7 d after vaccination were considered unprotected. 
¶Adjusted for weekly percentage of specimens yielding influenza only. 
#Undadjusted. 
**AGMP are defined as any one of the following: administration of nebulized therapy or humidified oxygen at >40%, use of bag-valve mask, manual 
ventilation, noninvasive ventilation, open airway suctioning, bronchoscopy or other upper airway endoscopy, tracheostomy, endotracheal intubation, 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, oscillatory ventilation, any procedure performed that involves manipulation of open ventilator tubing in a mechanically 
ventilated patient, sputum induction or other deliberate induction of coughing; OR for being in the same room during AGMP (>1/week) 6.63 (95% CI 2.05–
21.41); OR for participants performing AGMP (>1/week) 4.21 (1.12–15.76). 
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(April or May 2010) blood sampling caused by declining 
antibody titers over time. Recall bias might have played a 
role in that ill participants might have reported risk factors 
such as contact with sick people in the previous week more 
accurately than people who did not develop an illness. 
Finally, participating in the study may have reinforced 
awareness of the risk for influenza infection and thus may 
have raised adherence to protective measures.
We did not identify an increase in the risk for influenza 
among workers in acute care hospitals compared to office-
based workers during the 2009 pandemic. However, our 
findings are limited by lack of power. Within an HCW 
group, we were able to identify activities that could help 
focus prevention. Increasing efforts to improve hand 
hygiene and the use of protective equipment during aerosol-
generating medical procedures would further reduce the 
risk for influenza infection among HCWs.
Additional members of the Working Adult Influenza Cohort 
Study Group: Bjug Borgundvaag, Karen Green, Christine Moore 
(Mount Sinai Hospital, Toronto, Ontario, Canada); Steven Drews 
(Alberta Public Health Laboratory, Calgary, Alberta, Canada); D. 
Linn Holness, Matthew Muller (St. Michael’s Hospital, Toronto), 
Jennifer Johnstone (McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, 
Canada); Joanne Langley (Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova 
Scotia, Canada); Jeffrey C. Kwong (Institute for Clinical Evalua-
tive Sciences, Toronto); and Kathryn Nichol (Ontario Ministry of 
Labour, Toronto).
A.J.M. received funding for the Stop-Flu pilot studies for 
this project from GlaxoSmithKline and F. Hoffmann-La Roche 
Ltd. She also has received research funding from Sanofi Pasteur. 
G.D.S. has received research grants from GlaxoSmithKline and 
Sanofi Pasteur. Other authors: no conflicts.
S.P.K. was supported by a research fellowship of the Swiss 
National Science Foundation (grant number PBZHP3-125576). 
The project was funded by the Public Health Agency of Canada-
Canadian Institutes of Health Research Influenza Research 
Network (PCIRN) and the Ontario Agency of Health Promotion 
and Protection.
Funding organizations had no influence on design and 
conduct of the study; collection, management, analysis, and 
interpretation of the data; or preparation, review, or approval of 
the manuscript.
S.P.K. had full access to all the data in the study and takes 
responsibility for the integrity of the data and the accuracy of the 
data analysis.
Dr Kuster is an infectious diseases specialist and clinical 
epidemiologist at the University Hospital, Zurich, Division 
of Infectious Diseases and Hospital Epidemiology, Zurich, 
Switzerland. His research interests focus on epidemiology of 
influenza infection and antibiotic stewardship.
References
  1. Salgado CD, Farr BM, Hall KK, Hayden FG. Influenza in the acute 
hospital setting. Lancet Infect Dis. 2002;2:145–55. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/S1473-3099(02)00221-9
  2. Stott DJ, Kerr G, Carman WF. Nosocomial transmission of influenza. 
Occup Med (Lond). 2002;52:249–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/
occmed/52.5.249
  3. Voirin N, Barret B, Metzger MH, Vanhems P. Hospital-acquired 
influenza: a synthesis using the Outbreak Reports and Intervention 
Studies of Nosocomial Infection (ORION) statement. J Hosp Infect. 
2009;71:1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhin.2008.08.013
  4. Pearson ML, Bridges CB, Harper SA. Influenza vaccination of 
health-care personnel: recommendations of the Healthcare Infection 
Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) and the Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). MMWR Recomm 
Rep. 2006;55(RR-2):1–16.
  5. Talbot TR, Bradley SE, Cosgrove SE, Ruef C, Siegel JD, Weber DJ. 
Influenza vaccination of healthcare workers and vaccine allocation 
for healthcare workers during vaccine shortages. Infect Control Hosp 
Epidemiol. 2005;26:882–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/502512
  6. Weber DJ, Rutala WA, Schaffner W. Lessons learned: protection 
of healthcare workers from infectious disease risks. Crit Care 
Med. 2010;38(Suppl):S306–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/CCM.0b 
013e3181e69ebd
  7. Elder AG, O’Donnell B, McCruden EA, Symington IS, Carman WF. 
Incidence and recall of influenza in a cohort of Glasgow healthcare 
workers during the 1993–4 epidemic: results of serum testing and 
questionnaire. BMJ. 1996;313:1241–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/
bmj.313.7067.1241
  8. Public Health Agency of Canada. Guidance—H1N1 flu virus 
[cited 2011 Oct 31]. http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/alert-alerte/h1n1/
guidance_lignesdirectrices-eng.php#a4
  9. Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Provincial Infectious 
Diseases Advisory Committee. Best practices for hand hygiene in all 
health care settings. 2009;37–44 [cited 2011 Oct 31]. http://www.
oahpp.ca/resources/documents/pidac/Best%20Practices%20for%20
Hand%20Hygiene%20(2009-01).pdf
10. World Health Organization. WHO manual on animal influenza 
diagnosis and surveillance. Geneva: The Organization; 2002.
11. Beyer WE, Palache AM, Luchters G, Nauta J, Osterhaus AD. 
Seroprotection rate, mean fold increase, seroconversion rate: 
which parameter adequately expresses seroresponse to influenza 
vaccination? Virus Res. 2004;103:125–32. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.virusres.2004.02.024
12. Wyatt KN, Ryan GJ, Sheerin KA. Reduced-dose influenza vaccine. 
Ann Pharmacother. 2006;40:1635–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1345/
aph.1G645
13. Harrell FE. Overview of maximum likelihood estimation. In: 
Regression modeling strategies with applications to linear models, 
logistic regression, and survival models. New York: Springer; 2001. 
p. 179–214.
14. Williams CJ, Schweiger B, Diner G, Gerlach F, Haaman F, Krause G, 
et al. Seasonal influenza risk in hospital healthcare workers is more 
strongly associated with household than occupational exposures: 
results from a prospective cohort study in Berlin, Germany, 2006/07. 
BMC Infect Dis. 2010;10:8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1471-2334-10-8
15. Marshall C, Kelso A, McBryde E, Barr IG, Eisen DP, Sasadeusz J, 
et al. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 risk for frontline health care workers. 
Emerg Infect Dis. 2011;17:1000–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/
eid1706.101030
16. Kawana A, Teruya K, Kirikae T, Sekiguchi J, Kato Y, Kuroda E, et 
al. “Syndromic surveillance within a hospital” for the early detection 
of a nosocomial outbreak of acute respiratory infection. Jpn J Infect 
Dis. 2006;59:377–9.
614 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 19, No. 4, April 2013
Risk Factors for Influenza among Health Care Workers
17. Seto WH, Cowling BJ, Lam HS, Ching PT, To ML, Pittet D. Clinical 
and nonclinical health care workers faced a similar risk of acquiring 
2009 pandemic H1N1 infection. Clin Infect Dis. 2011;53:280–3. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cid/cir375
18. Talaat M, Afifi S, Dueger E, El-Ashry N, Marfin A, Kandeel A, et 
al. Effects of hand hygiene campaigns on incidence of laboratory-
confirmed influenza and absenteeism in schoolchildren, Cairo, 
Egypt. Emerg Infect Dis. 2011;17:619–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/
eid1704.101353
19. Esposito S, Daleno C, Baldanti F, Scala A, Campanini G, Taroni F, 
et al. Viral shedding in children infected by pandemic A/H1N1/2009 
influenza virus. Virol J. 2011;8:349. http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1743-
422X-8-349
20. Lee CK, Lee HK, Loh TP, Lai FY, Tambyah PA, Chiu L, et al. 
Comparison of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and seasonal influenza viral 
loads, Singapore. Emerg Infect Dis. 2011;17:287–91. http://dx.doi.
org/10.3201/eid1702.100282
21. Meschi S, Selleri M, Lalle E, Bordi L, Valli MB, Ferraro F, et al. 
Duration of viral shedding in hospitalized patients infected with 
pandemic H1N1. BMC Infect Dis. 2011;11:140. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1186/1471-2334-11-140
22. Heikkinen T, Salmi AA, Ruuskanen O. Comparative study of 
nasopharyngeal aspirate and nasal swab specimens for detection 
of influenza. BMJ. 2001;322:138. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/
bmj.322.7279.138
23. Larios OE, Coleman BL, Drews SJ, Mazzulli T, Borgundvaag B, 
Green K, et al. Self-collected mid-turbinate swabs for the detection 
of respiratory viruses in adults with acute respiratory illnesses. 
PLoS ONE. 2011;6:e21335. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0021335
24. Smieja M, Castriciano S, Carruthers S, So G, Chong S, Luinstra K, 
et al. Development and evaluation of a flocked nasal midturbinate 
swab for self-collection in respiratory virus infection diagnostic 
testing. J Clin Microbiol. 2010;48:3340–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1128/
JCM.02235-09
25. Papenburg J, Baz M, Hamelin ME, Rheaume C, Carbonneau J, 
Ouakki M, et al. Evaluation of serological diagnostic methods for the 
2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus. Clin Vaccine Immunol. 
2011;18:520–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1128/CVI.00449-10
Address for correspondence: Stefan P. Kuster, Department of 
Microbiology, Room 210, Mount Sinai Hospital, 600 University Ave, 
Toronto, ON M5G 1X5, Canada; email: spkuster@gmail.com
 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 19, No. 4, April 2013 615
All material published in Emerging Infectious Diseases is in 
the public domain and may be used and reprinted without 
special permission; proper citation, however, is required.
